As artificial intelligence’s capabilities improve, it is increasingly viewed as a general scientific method. But how true are these claims? Does AI outperform all techniques, or only some, and how is this changing? To assess the claims, we assemble a corpus of 2,507 head-to-head comparisons between AI and other scientific analysis techniques across 27 scientific disciplines from papers published between 2000 and early 2025. We find a profound dichotomy. Relative to traditional statistics, AI often outperforms, but at a significantly higher computational cost. But there are also nearly a quarter of cases where AI is both more expensive and performs worse than traditional statistical techniques and this fraction has been stable for a decade. Relative to scientific computing, AI often underperforms, but at lower computational cost. This has begun to change: since 2020, AI’s performance against scientific computing has notably strengthened and it now outperforms on more than half of comparisons. These patterns suggest that AI is therefore not a universal replacement for existing methods, but rather a valuable – and improving – part of a new AI-enabled scientific frontier.

Scientific progress is a key driver of economic growth and prosperity. There is great excitement - but also concerns - about the impacts of AI on science, but so far little data. We provide early insights on this from three data sources: a sample of 15 million Gemini interactions, an inventory of over 2,600 specialized AI models across disciplines, and a survey of over 600 scientists. We map these data to a new taxonomy of scientific tasks to study how scientists are using AI. Four main findings emerge. First, we find broad adoption and coverage: scientists use AI more than most other occupations. Specialized AI models have broad disciplinary coverage and are highly cited. Nearly half of the scientists surveyed report using some form of AI every day. Second, we document evidence that LLMs (proxied through Gemini usage) and specialized models act as complements–LLMs are used for general analysis, coding, and manuscript preparation, while specialized models provide domain-specific predictions, data generation and classification. Third, scientists report large productivity gains from using AI: a saving of nearly 7 hours per week, time which is primarily re-invested in more research. Finally, we show that AI is already changing the scientific process. As some stages of scientific research become easier, bottlenecks shift downstream. Scientists report an increased backlog of untested hypotheses and substantial demand for output verification. Our findings suggest that AI holds significant potential to increase scientific productivity. However, as with other sectors, its ultimate impact will be governed by complex task interdependencies and investment into the elimination of emerging bottlenecks.

Scaling laws describe how language model capabilities grow with compute and data, but say nothing about how long a model matters once released. We introduce time-to-peak and lifespan as measures of model obsolescence and use them to characterize the scientific adoption trajectories of 62 LLMs across more than 108k citing papers (2019-2025), separating active adoption from background citation to recover per-model trajectories that citation counts cannot resolve. We find that a model's longevity is shaped more by when it was released than by its characteristics: release year predicts time-to-peak and lifespan more strongly than architecture, openness, or scale. LLM adoption follows an inverted-U curve (rising after release, peaking, and then declining), but this pattern is rapidly compressing. Each successive release year is associated with a 27% shorter time-to-peak and a 23% shorter lifespan (p<0.001), robust to minimum-age thresholds and controls for model size. These adoption-side dynamics are invisible to scaling laws and suggest that specialization on any single model may be a depreciating investment, with costs falling on reproducibility and migration.