The past decade has seen incredible scaling of AI systems by a few companies, leading to inequality in AI model performance. This paper argues that, contrary to prevailing intuition, the diminishing returns to compute scaling will lead to a convergence of AI model capabilities. In other words, meek models (those with limited computation budget) shall inherit the earth, approaching the performance level of the best models overall. We develop a model illustrating that under a fixed-distribution next-token objective, the marginal capability returns to raw compute shrink substantially. Given current scaling practices, we argue that these diminishing returns are strong enough that even companies that can scale their models exponentially faster than other organizations will eventually have little advantage in capabilities. As part of our argument, we give several reasons that proxies like training loss differences capture important capability measures using evidence from benchmark data and theoretical performance models. In addition, we analyze empirical data on the capability difference of AI models over time. Finally, in light of the increasing ability of meek models, we argue that AI strategy and policy require reexamination, and we outline the areas this shift will affect.

Deep learning's recent history has been one of achievement: from triumphing over humans in the game of Go to world-leading performance in image classification, voice recognition, translation, and other tasks. But this progress has come with a voracious appetite for computing power. This article catalogs the extent of this dependency, showing that progress across a wide variety of applications is strongly reliant on increases in computing power. Extrapolating forward this reliance reveals that progress along current lines is rapidly becoming economically, technically, and environmentally unsustainable. Thus, continued progress in these applications will require dramatically more computationally-efficient methods, which will either have to come from changes to deep learning or from moving to other machine learning methods.

Algorithms are one of the fundamental building blocks of computing. But current evidence about how fast algorithms improve is anecdotal, using small numbers of case studies to extrapolate. In this work, we gather data from 57 textbooks and more than 1,137 research papers to present the first systematic view of algorithm progress ever assembled. There is enormous variation. Around half of all algorithm families experience little or no improvement. At the other extreme, 13% experience transformative improvements, radically changing how and where they can be used. Overall, we find that, for moderate-sized problems, 30% to 45% of algorithmic families had improvements comparable or greater than those that users experienced from Moore's Law and other hardware advances